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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------- ---------- ---------DARRELL J. DIDERICKSEN &
SONS, INC., a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
MAGNA WATER & SEWER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,

CASE NO. 1612 9

vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant,
and
TE}WLETON. LINKE & ASSOCIATES,
Third-Party Defendant.

-----------------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

-----------------------------------------NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff-respondent,
Darrell J. Didericksen and Sons, Inc., (hereinafter plaintiff)
to recover damages for breach of contract by defendantappellant, Magna Water & Sewer Improvement District, (hereinafter
Magna) and to recover $29,281.00 due under the contract between
plaintiff and Magna.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Magna counterclaimed against plaintiff and filed ThirdParty actions against Utah State Department of Transportation,
(hereinafter DOT) and Temnleton, Linke ~' Associates, (hereinafter
Templeton) on theories of contractual indemnity and negligence
respectively
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable J. E. Banks
of the Third Judicial District Court who awarded plaintiff a
money judgment in the sum of $24, 969. 00 plus interest, said suTTI
being the contract price for the labor and material provided
by plaintiff as of the date of termination less applicable discounts.
The court ruled that Magna breached the contract and dismissed
Magna' s counterclairr, but also held plaintiff and failed to
establish with certainty its anticipated profits.

DOT was held

to be liable to Magna for the ultimate judgment of the court and
Magna stipulated that its claim against Templeton could be dismissed since the court had not allowed any damages for breach
except the contract price of services and materials actually
rendered.

The trial court denied Magna's motion for a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent.

seeks to have the judgment of the

lower court affirmed and costs awarded to the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case rises from a construction contract between
Magna and plaintiff for the relocation of a sewer line along 2400 sou:·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in 'fa~a, Utah.

In preparation for bidding on the contract,

plaintiff's personnel insoected the construction site and found
it to be mostly open field with substantial ground water throughout the western oortion which furt11er investigation showed to
be mainlv irrigation run-off (Record: 535, 536).

The bid

plans showed a freeway which was to be built, but all freewav
drawings were marked "future construction".

The term "future

construction" means, for construction after the contract in which
the hid was to be rendered (R. 678).

The contract made time

of the essence, called for progress payments to be made by
Magna by the 15th of the month for work done in the prior
month, and required a written change order before payment could
be made for any changed construction (Exh. 1-P:
tions, Paragraphs 18,19,22, and 25 (a)).

general condi-

The contract further

required that constructionbe completed within 180 days of the
beginning of construction (Exh. 1-P:

information for bidders,

Item 9).
Plaintiff was the low bidder and signed the contract
on the 9th day of September 1975.

On the 12th day of September,

1975, Darrell J. Didericksen, president of plaintiff, noticed
that construction vehicles had pulled on to the area of the
sewer relocation project (R. 537).

Aporoxirntely three days

later at the preconstruction conference, plaintiff's oersonnel
were told that W.

w.

Clvde would be constructing the freeway

at the same time as plaintiff's relocation contract would be
going forward.

Prior to the signing of the contract, Magna had
-3-
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been notified that W. W.

Clvde would be undertaking

construction,

but had failed to make anv indication of that fact in its bid
drawings or to otherwise notifv plaintiff (Exh. 17-P, R. Fi77,

6 79).
At the preconstruction conference, plaintiff was
requested to begin construction in the middle of the project
to avoid conflict with the freeway contractor.

Plaintiff's

personnel indicated they would begin in the middle if a change
order were issued to cover the cost of building a pad throu~h
the ground water and to cover the additional costs of starting
at the middle rather than the low end of the sewer line (R. 538,
539, 540, 541), Jim Didericksen, plaintiff's vice-president,
Pointed out that the plaintiff had contemnlated constructinv,
the west end of the project in mid-winter when there was no
irrigation and the remaining ground water would be frozen
and therefore had not included the cost of a construction pad
in this bid.

Beginning in the middle of the project would also

impose upon plaintiff the burden of pumping substantial water,
whereas beginning construction at the low end of the seuer line
would not (R. 617).

In the course of several discussions of the

topic, Robert Emerson, project engineer for Temnleton (Magna's
engineers), indicated to plaintiff that he would attemot to obtain
a change order and as a result of said conversations, plaintiff
made prenarations to begin in the middle of the project (R. 541.
542. 831).
On the 8th day of October 1975, Jim Didericksen was
told by Robert Emerson that Mr. Emerson had redesigned the project
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to avoid conflicts with the highway contractor and that
nlaintiff could, "proceed with the project as he had originally
bid it.

In other words,

planned'' (R. 831).

he could start at the location he had

Plaintiff began work on the 15th of October

at the east end where the sewer trench was lowest (R. 523).
On the 7th day of November 1975, plaintiff submitted
its estimate of $22, 744.32 for work done in October, oursuant
to oral instructions received by plaintiff at the preconstruction
conference to the effect that estimates submitted bv the 12th
would be paid by the 15th (R. 523).

The estimate was approved

for payment by Templeton (Exh. 3-P).
Magna on November 15th.

No payment was made by

Plaintiff submitted another estimate

of S54,386.46 on the 8th day of December for work done in
November which was also aporoved.
the

15t~

Magna made no payment on

of December (R. 525, 526).
Construction on the freeway had progressed during

October and November so that many obstacles were now placed
in the line of the sewer relocation project including excavations, drainage trenches, and fences (Exh. 13-P, 16-P:
550).

R. 546-

The attempt by Templeton to redraw the sewer line had

not solved the oroblem (R. 525).

Templeton conceded there

was a change in condition and aonlied for authorization to issue
a change order (Exh. 16-P).

On December 22nd plaintiff notified

Magna that it was about to reach a point where no further
construction could be undertaken under the original drawings
and that if a change order was not issued, and the delinquent
-5-
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progress payments made, plaintiff would pull off the job (Exh.
No change order was issued and no vavment made.

-P)
6

Pl aintiff ceased

work on the 27th of December, 1975.
Magna finallv made pavment on t'1e plaintiff's first two
estimates in January and February of 1976 but has not vaid plaintiff for the construction •vork comoleted in Decer:iber of 1975 nor
for the 10'7o of the October and November work which was retained.
amounting to a total of aooroximtelv $24,000 after discounts,
as reflected in the judgment rendered by the trial court.

Also

after the plaintiff had ceased work, Magna negotiated for and
finally obtained easements which allowed Magna to redesign
the sewer line to avoid many of the conflicts with the highwav
construction.

In August of 1976 Magna let a contract to J. Tuft

to construct the newly aligned sewer (Exh. 9-D, Apoendix A. R. 751)
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT Is FINDING THAT cmlSTRUCTION OF
THE SEWER RELOCATION PROJECT COULD NOT BE
COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE CONTRACT IS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
It is established law in contract cases, as in other

cases, that the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed
on appeal if there is "a reasonable basis in evidence to suooort
it".

Holman v.

Sorensen, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976); Charleton v.

Hackett, 11 U.2d 339. 360 P . 2d 176 (1961) .

Tw o exhibits in the

evidence established clearly that the court's finding of a substantial change in the construction oroject was correct and was
supported by the evi d ence.

The first is Exhibit 16-P which is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a letter from Templeton to DOT conceding that there was a change
in circumstances in the sewer relocation oroject and requesting
oermission of DOT to issue a change order to the plaintiff.
The second item of evidence is defendant's own
exhibit (Exh. 9-D, Aopendix A) which shows a portion of the
sewer relocation oroject as bid and as constructed (R. 534).
The point where the sewer line as constructed (black line)
diverges from the line as bid (red line) is the verv point
where plaintiff ceased work (R. 560).

The project had changed

so substantially that the defendants themselves elected not
to construct the sewer line along the line of the original
bid but along a new line which avoided many of the obstacles
with which plaintiff was faced on the 27th of December 1975
when plaintiff discontinued work on the project.

The line

along which Magna ultimately hired Mr. Tuft to construct the
sewer was not available to the plaintiff in December of 1975
since easements for said alignment were not acquired by
defendants until at least January of 1976 (R. 833, 834), and
probably not until June of 1976 (R. 559, 665, 666).
In December of 1975 nlaintiff's only options were
either to continue constructing along the line of the original
bid or to shut down.

The substantial nature of the obstacles

Placed along the line of the original bid are outlined in
Exhibit 6-P and described in the testimony
( R. 559, R. 546-552 ) .

of James Didericksen

These obtacles included newly excavated

Piles of dirt, fences, and drainage canals.

(See Exh. 13-P

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

and 14-P).

All of these changes constituted a verv different

construction project than the one plaintiff's agents had contemplated when thev prepared their bid after observing the construction site, an open field.
Nor is the change mitigated bv the fact that
plaintiff's bid was in unit prices.

What constitutes a reasonable

bid per linear foot of sewer trench for an open field is not
reasonable when the contractor only has access to one side
of trench for stacking the excavated material and hauling in
select backfill or when the excavation passes through or along
newly constructed ditches or embankments where shoring, Dumping,
and restoration must take place.
The court's

conclusion

t'1at the responsibilitv

for the change in conditions falls upon Magna, is also sunported
by the evidence.

Magna had been notified t~at the freewav

construction would be underway during the term of the sewer relocation project, but had failed to reflect that in the bid snecifications or to notify plaintiff of the fact in any manner (Exh.

17-P, R. 677, 678, 679).

The drawings showing freewav construe-

tion were clearly labeled "future construction".

Mr. Keith Slater,

an engineer and ulaintiff' s expert witness, testified that the
term "future constru;,,,tion" meant, to be constructed outside of
the time frame of the sewer relocation contract (Exh. 8-P, R. 678) ·
All the evidence before the trial court shows the plaintiff first
.
f
t ·
0 f cont'.:
learned of the imuending freewav construction a ter execu ion

- 8-
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Contrary to the allegations in appellants' brief,
plaintiff was not put to the election of beginning construction in the middle of the relocation project.

Plaintiff had

indicated it would begin construction in the middle of the
project if a Change Order were issued by

Magn~

and Magna's

agent, Robert Emerson, the project manager, had agreed to
" ... check '"i th the state and determine what could be done in
this area" (R. 831).

Robert Emerson then reports the follow-

ing telephone conversation:
On the 8th of October I had a telephone
conversation with Jim Didericksen wherein
I told him to proceed with the project
as he had originally bid it. In other
words, start at the location he had
planned. I also indicated to him that
we had realigned the sewer at the box
culvert West of 8400 West to eliminate
a conflict in location there and I felt
that because we had a unit price contract
that he could nroceed in that area without
any Change Orders (R.831).
Plaintiff, in all good faith, began construction
as instructed.

The fact that Robert EI'lerson's realignment did

not alleviate the problem is shown not only in the testimony
of Jim Didericksen to that effect (R. 552, 553), but by
Templeton's own judgment that as of the 21st of November a
change condition existed (Exh. 16-P).

Upon learning that the

problem had not been solved, plaintiff again requested a
Change Order to continue construction.

On the 22nd of December

plaintiff notified defendant that plaintiff would no longer
be able to continue construction unless a Change Order was
-9-
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issued (Exh. 6-P).
Jim Didericksen testified that as of the 27th of
December 1975 plaintiff had reached the

·
point in construction

where it could no longer continue under the original bid document, having reached the area of freewav construction and having
received no Chanze Order.

Plaintiff therefore terminated work.

The evidence clearly supports the trial court's Finding of Fact
that:
Because of the highwav construction, construction of the sewer relocation project could not
be completed in accordance with the terms and
specifications of the contract entered into
between plaintiff and defendant. (R. 303)
The evidence also supports the court's conclusion that Magna is
the party responsible for the changed condition.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT MAGNA BREACHED THE
CONTRACT BY FAILING TO MAKE TIMELY PROGRESS PAYMENTS
AND THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT WAIVE MAGNA'S BREACH ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The contract between plaintiff was drawn bv Magna or
Magna's agents and makes time of the essence (Exh. 1-P:
conditions Paragraph 19) .

general

The contract requires Magna to make

progress payments by the 15th of each month as follows:
Not later than the 15th day of each calendar
month the o'Wt'ler shall make a progress payment
to the contractor on the basis of a duly certified and approved estimate performed during the
preceding calendar month under this cont~act: ..
provided, that the contractor.shall submit his
estimate not later than the first day of the
month ... (Exh. 1-P: general conditions Paragraph 25 (a)).
As appellant's brief points out

plaintiff was told by

Magna's agents at the preconstruction conference that estimates

-10-
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submitted by the 12th would be oaid by the 15th.

Plaintiff

submitted an estimate of $22,744.32 for the work done in
October on the 7th of November which estimate was approved by
Templeton and submitted another estimate of $54,386.46 on
the 8th day of December for work done in November which estimate was also approved for payment by Templeton (Exh. 3-P,
4-P, R. 523, and 526).
The trial court did not find Magna's failure to make
payment on the 15th of November to be a breach of the contract
since the estimate had not been submitted by the 1st of November.
The court however did find that Magna's failure to make a
payment of $22, 744.32 on the 15th day of December was a breach
of t11e contract which iustified plaintiff's termination of
work on the 27th of December (Findings of Fact and Conclusion
of Law:

Conclusion II (3), R. 306).
Where time is of the essence of the contract. failure

to oerform within the time stipulated is sufficient breach
to allow the non-breaching party to consider the contract at
an end.
(Wash

Universitv Properties Inc. v. Moss, 388 P.2d 543
1964), 17A C.J.S. Contracts 422 (1) Page 520.
In the case of Wagstaff v. Remco, 540 P.2d 931

(Utah 1975) there is no indication of a contract provision
making time of the essence.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court

sustained the trial court's finding that a one month delay in
the payment of a progress payment justified the contractor
in pulling off the job.

Even applying the standard of Remco to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this case the trial court's finding is sustained by the evidence.

In light of the representations made by Magna's agent

at the pre-construction conference as to the d ate f or su b mitting
estimates for payment. plaintiff reasonably anticipated receiving
payments by the 15th of December totallv in excess of $77,100.00
The contract requires the contractor pay for all materials and
transportation services bv the 20th day of the

mont~

following

the month in which the service or materials were provided (Exh.
1-P:

general conditions Paragranh 27).

The court made a specific

finding that in preparing plaintiff's bid, plaintiff had negotiated
agreements with plaintiff's material suppliers which allowed
plaintiff a discount for prompt payment for materials and plaintiff
had relied on these discounts in calculating Plaintiff's bid
(Findings of Fact IX, R.

304).

The trial court made a specific finding that plaintiff
had not waived its right to receive payment in full bv accepting
the $77,000 payment made by Magna after termination of work
(Finding of Fact XVI, R.

by plaintiff.
such as this,

305).

In contract matters

the findings and judgment of the trial court enjoy

a presumption of validity and appellant has the burden of showin~

~g_.

from the record that the trial court erred in its finding.

Tolman Construction Company Inc. v. Myton Water Association, 563
P.2d 780 (Utah 1977).

·m Di"deri"cksen shows that plaintiff
The testimony Of Jl
learned for the first time at the pre-construction conference
.

t

that Magna was obtaining the funds for the construction pro] ec
from the State.

·me. however. of any
No mention was ma d e at anv_ t l
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delav in pavments (R. 621).

In fact, at the pre-construction

conference Magna's agent affirmed that if estimates where
submitted by the 12th payments would be made by the 15th.
There is no evidence in the record of any agreement by plaintiff
or plaintiff's personnel to allow Magna any delay in the making
of installment Pavments.

In its notice of breach and demand

for cure, dated December 22nd, plaintiff specifically demanded
that Magna oay the progress payments due (Exh. 6-P).

Magna

paid the $77,000.00 of installments after termination of the
contract without negotiation or stioulation from plaintiff.
All of the above sustains the finding of the trial court that
there was no waiver of

~agna's

breach.

Nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply to the
facts of this case.

There is neither evidence that the nlaintiff

acquiesced in Magna's late payment, nor is there evidence that
any conduct of Magna whatsoever was motivated by Magna's reliance
upon anv alleged acauiescence on the part of the plaintiff.
Exhibit 6-P clearly shows that plaintiff asserted its claim
for progress payments during the period in which the contract
was in force and gave Magna an opportunity to cure its breach
which Magna refused to do.

The estoppel argument was made

to trial court which responded as follows:
(Mr. Wright) We think, your Honor, that he
has waived that provision with respect to
payment on the 15th.
THE COURT:
MR. WRIGHT:

Well, let me put it to you this way.
And that he's estopped.
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THE COURT:
Looking at it most favorably
as I recall, in order to make--get that '
p~yment by the 15th, they had to be submitted by the 1st. And according to
my notes, his first estimate was submitted
on November the 7th.
So, the strict interpretation of the contract, he couldn't
expect to be Paid until the 15th of December.
Where does that put you in your
position?
MR. WRIGHT:
Well, the position t>i.at i t
Puts us in is that he wasn't paid on the
15th.
THE COURT:
He wasn't paid.
He can quit
within twelve days, and he quit within
twelve days of when he was entitled to be
paid under the terms of the contract.
Your motion's denied.
(R. 699)
That finding is supported by the evidence.
POINT III: THE RECORD CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLANT, MAGNA,
BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY FAILING TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF
WITH WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION TO UNDERTAKE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE SEWER RELOCATION
PROJECT.
Again, in Point Three. appellant appears to be attacking a finding of fact of the trial court upon which substantial
evidence was presented at trial and the court ruled in favor
of the plaintiff.

The trial court found that

Changes in construction and the necessity for
coordination, which resulted because of the
highway construction. were ~ub~tan~ial a~d .
,
were not anticipated by plaintiff in plaintiff s
bid.
and
Plaintiff requested permission ~rom d:fendant to
undertake the changed construction which defendant failed to grant.

-14-
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and concluded therefrom that defendant, Magna, breached the
contract:
by failing to provide plaintiff with written
authorization to undertake construction of
the substantial changes in the sewer relocation proj7ct whi~h :esulted from the highway
construction. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law: Finding VI and VIII and Conclusion II
( 2)) .

Jim Didericksen testified that at the time Magna
requested plaintiff to begin construction in the middle of the
sewer relocation project, plaintiff requested a Change Order
which Magna's agent attempted to procure (R. 831).

Thereafter,

defendant's agent. Robert Emerson. told plaintiff that drawings
would be forthcoming which would alleviate the conflict and
that plaintiff could begin construction of the project as it
had originally bid the project (R. 831, see exact quote in
Point One above).

As work progressed it became clear that

the attempt of Templeton to avoid the conflict had not succeeded, (R. 552) and Templeton at the request of the plaintiff
again attempted to obtain permission to issue a Change Order
(Exh. 16-P).

Nowhere in this chain of events did plaintiff

agree to undertake construction of the changed portion of the
Project without written authorization from Magna.
Appellant, however, seems to argue that plaintiff
had a duty to immediately rescind the contract upon discovering
the possible conflict and cites the case of Herwits v. David K.
Richards Como~. 20 U.2d 232. 436 P.2d 749 (Utah 1968) in
support of that proposition.

The Herwits case, however, is an

-15-
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anticipatory breac~ case and therefore is not anplicable here
In the nresent case, as Exhibit 16-P demonstrates, Magna did not
unequivocally reject plaintiff's request for a Change Order
On November 27th, Magn 's agent took action to procure a Change
Order

(Exh. 16-P).

Plaintiff was not put to the election to

shut down until plaintiff had reached a point in construction
where it could no longer continue construction without a
Change Order.

That day came on the 27th of December. 1975.

when plaintiff elected to discontinue work rather

t~1an

the changed construction without written authorization.
!:!~rwits

case, the opinion reads, at Page 235:

undertake
In the

"If there had been

an anticipatory breach Richard had three ootions available to
him;" then the court lists the three options mentioned in the
appellant's brief.

Those options were not presented to the

plaintiff in this case until it became clear from ~agna's
actions that it would not issue a written order for plaintiff
to undertake the changed construction.

This became clear from

Magna's failure to respond to plaintiff's demand for such an
order;

(Exh. 6-P) whereupon, plaintiff made the election to

discontinue work on the contract.
In Weber Meadowview Corporation v. Wild, 575
P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1978). the court stated with approval
the proposition that, "One who enters into a contract must cooperate in good faith to carry out the intention the parties had in
mind when it was ma d e " .

74
Fi"sher v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 19 )

In R. C. Tolman Construction Company

I

nc.

v

·

Myton Water Assoc~
_

tion, supra, the court said:
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It is true that there is an implied
obligation arising out of a construction contract that the person hiring the
work to be done will cooperate with the
contractor and will not hinder or delay
his performance.
(at 782).
Since Magna had known of the intention of W. W. Clyde to undertake freeway construction in the area of the sewer relocation project prior to the letting of the sewer relocation contract and had failed to make that fact known to the olaintiff,
it had, at the very least, a duty to cooperate with the contract
by issuing Change Orders which would allow plaintiff to receive
compensation for the extra expenses entailed in coordinating
or avoiding the freewav construction.

The trial court correctly

ruled that Magna's failure to do so was a breach of contract.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERY
DAMAGES.

CO~UTED

PLAINTIFF'S

There can be no dispute that the proper formula
for the computation of damages of an executory contract is
the contract orice less the reasonable cost of completion.
Holman v. Sorensen, supra. Wagstaff v. Remco, supra.

In

the case before the court, the plaintiff presented evidence
to establish that the reasonable cost of completion of the
sewer relocation project as originally bid would have produced
a profit for the plaintiff, which plaintiff should have been
entitled to recover as a result of Magna's breach.

The trial

court, however, found that plaintiff's evidence was not
sufficiently certain to establish that the reasonable cost
-17-
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of completion would have been less than contract vrice for the
balance of the proiect and therefore awarded vlaintiff no lost
profit.

The court, however, did award the plaintiff the contract

price for the portion of the project alreadv comvleted in the
sum of $24,969.00 plus interest, a finding 1vhich the aooellant
apparentlv does not contest.
In the case of Keller v. Deseret Mortuarv
Company, 23 U.2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 (1979), the court and oarties
conceded that the non-breaching oarty was entitled to recover
the reasonable value of the work oerforDed and the materials
furnished.

The court stated the general rule as follows:
The assessment of damages by the trial
court was consistent with the general
orincioal which underlies the ascertainment of damages for breach of contract.
That the non-breaching partv should
receive an award which will out him in
as good a position as he would have been
in had there been no breach.
(at 3)

Under the standard of the Keller case, the non-breaching partv
(plaintiff) would be entitled to the contract orice for the completed portion of the contract, the plaintiff having alreadv
incurred the cost of completion.

Plaintiff would also be entitled

to the contract price for the uncompleted oortion of the contract less the reasonable cost of completion.

The trial court's

finding that plaintiff's evidence was not sufficientlv certain
to establish a difference between the contract price and the
reasonable cost of comoletion of the executor:1 portion of the
contract should not in any wav deprive the olaintiff of the
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benefit of its bargain for the portion of the contract completed.
It is clear that the trial court made no finding as
to the reasonable cost of completion of the contract.

Apnellant

asks the Sunreme Court to find,however,that the reasonable
cost of completion is the sum paid by Magna to its contractor,
Tuft, after August 1976 for the completion of the newly aligned
project.

As Exhibit 9-D (Appendix A) clearly shows, the

sewer line constructed by Tuft was not the one bid upon the
plaintiff.

The mere fact that Tuft's contract was let one

year after plaintiff's contract is enough to disqualify it
as an indication of the reasonable costs of completion, in
light of the historical inflation
and labor.

in the cost of materials

There is no evidence in the record to establish

that the sewer line constructed by Tuft is similar to the
one bid upon by the plaintiff either in time, terms, or
surrounding circumstance.

Finally, the Supreme Court is

not the proper court to make a finding of fact in a contract
case (~~v. Stockdale and Company, 570 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1977).
Appellant is asking this court to impose upon
plaintiff the same damages which would have been imposed had
the trial court found plaintiff to be the breaching party.
Since plaintiff is the innocent party, it should receive, at
the very least, the contract price of the materials and services
actually rendered which is exactly what the trial court has
awarded.
-19-
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CONCLUSION
There is ample evidence in the record to sunnort the
findings of the trial court that Magna failed to make tilTlelv
progress payments in breach of its contractual obligation and
that MaE>,na failed to inform plaintiff of the freewav construction
which would conflict with plaintiff's contract and failed to
issue ulaintiff a change order to allow plaintiff to coordinate
with, or avoid said construction all in breach of Magna's
contractual obligations, which breach justified plaintiff in
terminating the contract.

The trial court awarded Plaintiff

the contract price for the materials and services actuallv
provided to Magna bv the plaintiff and plaintiff respectfullv
submits that as the innocent partv nlaintiff is entitled to that
measure of damages.
DATED

this~~~

dav of

~

' 1979.

~.~2£:i#J

KING AND PETERSON
Attornev for Respondent
Suite 205 Sentinel Building
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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